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NORMALCY AFTER 9/11:
PUBLIC SERVICE AS THE CRISIS FADES
Russell Engler*
INTRODUCTION
There is much to celebrate regarding the legal community's re-
sponse to the legal needs arising out of the September 11, 2001
attacks.' Chief Judge Kaye rightly delights in the picture of "the
Bar at its finest, its shining hour; thousands of lawyers, paralegals
and staff, hundreds of thousands of hours enthusiastically volun-
teered for the public good."2 As the Report's introduction summa-
rizes, and the body of the Report details, the response of the legal
community was "fast, thoughtful, comprehensive and creative."3
The raw numbers are impressive. Volunteer lawyers represented
more than 4,000 individuals and families who were affected by the
disaster.4 Approximately 3,000 lawyers received September 11th
training through the City Bar and in-house law firm programs.5
* Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, New England School of
Law. I am grateful for the helpful feedback I received from Tracy Miller, Mary Helen
McNeal, and Bruce Green. This work was supported by a Stipend from the Board of
Trustees of New England School of Law.
1. See Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK FUND, INC., ET AL., PUB-
LIC SERVICE IN A TIME OF CRISIS: A REPORT AND RETROSPECTIVE ON THE LEGAL
COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, (2004), reprinted in
31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 833 (2004) (hereinafter ABCNY FUND, ET AL.]; Serge
Schmemann, U.S. Attacked; President Vows to Exact Punishment for 'Evil', N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
2. Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Foreword to ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK FUND, INC., ET AL., PUBLIC SERVICE IN A TIME OF CRISIS: A REPORT AND
RETROSPECTIVE ON THE LEGAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS OF SEP-
TEMBER 11, 2001, at 5 (2004), reprinted in 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 833 (2004)
[hereinafter Kaye, Foreword].
3. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 840.
4. Id.
5. Id.; see also Michael A. Cardozo, Legal Heroes of September 11th, Speech to
the Am. Corporate Counsel Ass'n at the Fed. Reserve Bank (June 13, 2002) (describ-
ing the response of the legal community to Bar Association training sessions and re-
lated calls for volunteers in the wake of September l1th), available at http://
www.nyc.gov/html/la w/pressreleases/sp061302.pdf; NY Lawyers Answer 9/11 Call
with Surge of Pro Bono Work, N.Y. L., July 23, 2002 (providing that the City Bar
Fund database of lawyers available for on-call assignments to pro-bono cases in-
creased by more than 3,000 names after September l1th) [hereinafter NY Lawyers
Answer 9/11 Call], available at http://www.nyl awyer.com/news/02/07/072302e.html.
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Over 2,800 lawyers registered on the ProBono.net, a 9/11 website,
to gain information and resources.6
The raw numbers are only the beginning of the story of the legal
community's response. "[T]he institutions that make up the New
York area legal community collaborated in ways never previously
imagined. Where turf battles once existed, cooperation pre-
vailed."7 Chief Judge Kaye observes in the Report's Foreword that
the Report itself is an "extraordinary primer"-"a comprehensive
textbook on how best to deliver pro bono services!"'8 Each chapter
is filled with information crucial to those who might attempt to
glean lessons from the 9/11 experience and translate them to other
endeavors. The Report sets forth the "Foundations of the Legal
Community's Response"9 and describes the rich variety of "Spe-
cific Projects Designed to Aid Victims."1 The Report turns to
"Ongoing Efforts and Unmet Needs"" before describing "Survey
Results" of the volunteer lawyers and organizations that responded
to the crisis.12
The final part of the Report offers eighteen lessons learned, in
the "hope that the 9/11 legal response will be an instructive exam-
ple for future legal relief efforts. ' 13 The lessons are divided into
three categories: "Responding as a Community"; 4 "Responding to
6. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 840; NY Lawyers Answer 9/11 Call,
supra note 5.
7. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 840.
8. Kaye, Foreword, supra note 2, at 833.
9. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 843-868 (finding, in Part I of the Re-
port, that the legal community's response was coordinated among the courts, bar as-
sociations, legal service organizations, the private bar, insurance counsel, government
attorneys and law schools).
10. Id. at 868-906. Such projects, discussed in Part II of the Report, included Vol-
unteer Notary Assistance, the Expedited Death Certificate Assistance Project, the
Legal Aid and Legal Services Help Desk, Uniformed Officer and Family Assistance,
Family Service Guides, the Immigrant Affairs Help Desk, the Trusts and Estates Help
Desk, Outreach to Disadvantaged Communities, Aid for Detainees and Victims of
Discrimination, the Small Business Legal Relief Initiative, the In-House Counsel and
the Angels Project, the Law Student and Law School Response, the Victim Compen-
sation Fund, and New Jersey Victim Assistance. Id.
11. Id. at 906-07 (noting, in Part III of the Report, that despite the sustained in-
volvement of many attorneys from 2001 forward, there are still many individuals
whose 9/11-related legal needs remain unaddressed).
12. Id. at 908-28.
13. Id. at 928-930.
14. Id. at 930-33 (describing, in Lessons 1-7, what it means to respond to crisis as a
community and explaining that "[e]very element of the national legal community had
a role to play in responding to 9/11").
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a Disaster"; 15 and "Improvements for the Future. ' 16 Chief Judge
Kaye's only disagreement with the "Lessons Learned" is that she
sees not only eighteen lessons, but "hundreds of lessons ...for
organizing, delivering, and overseeing pro bono services. "17
As we celebrate the unprecedented achievement of the legal
community in the aftermath of the September 11th attack, we
should examine the achievements with a critical eye. The evalua-
tion should not be limited to the year following September 11th.
Rather, as the crisis "fades" and the profession, along with the rest
of the world, settles into "normalcy" post-9/11, the questions be-
come more difficult:
Despite the extensive response of the legal community, to what
extent did the response prove inadequate? 18
To what extent does the unique nature and magnitude of the
September 11th disaster render the impressive response some-
thing we cannot replicate, even to a lesser degree?19
Even to the extent the response was successful, to what extent
did the response constitute a diversion of existing resources
from other endeavors, rather than an overall increase in pro
bono and public services efforts?2"
If the Report is to serve as a primer for legal communities, what
lessons from the response to September 11th can be applied to
other settings, and how can we apply them?21
Although it seems unpatriotic to raise questions as to the ulti-
mate success of the endeavor, I do so despite my complete admira-
tion and respect for the efforts of those inside and outside the legal
community who responded immediately, creatively, and tirelessly
to the horrific events of September 11th and its aftermath. I do so
15. Id. at 933-37 (explaining, in Lessons 8-16, the importance of such things as
"[s]wift action ... maximizing volunteerism and cooperation").
16. Id. at 938 (explaining, in Lessons 17-18, that the legal community should strive
to make improvements for the future, such as fostering "collaborat[ion] and build[ing]
relationships with social services agencies").
17. Kaye, Foreword, supra note 2, at 833.
18. See, e.g., ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 907 (noting shortcomings of
the post 9/11 legal relief efforts and commenting that "although many needs continue
to exist, the rush of legal volunteers has diminished").
19. See, e.g., infra notes 39-41 (discussing difficulties in sustaining the response of
the volunteer legal community to the crisis of homelessness); see also infra notes 133,
185-187 and accompanying text (discussing the shortage of volunteers for pro bono
initiatives and efforts to foster an increase in such volunteer involvement).
20. See ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 845; infra notes 69, 89 and accom-
panying text.
21. See ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 930-38 (expressing the "hope that
the 9/11 legal response will be an instructive example for future legal relief efforts").
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in the spirit of the implicit challenge of Chief Judge Kaye's Fore-
word to the Report, where she notes: "the fact is that for families
facing homelessness, or eviction, or deportation, or foster care, or
innumerable other life challenges, every day is also a time of cri-
sis."' 22 The success of the legal community's efforts must therefore
be measured not only by analysis of the response to the 9/11 crisis
itself, but also by consideration of whether the lessons learned pave
the way for an improved response by the legal community to the
legal crises facing countless families every day.
I. ONGOING EFFORTS AND UNMET NEEDS
A primary reason to identify lessons learned from the legal com-
munity's response to the 9/11 crisis is to create the possibility that
the achievements of the 9/11 effort can serve as a model to solve
legal problems arising from other crises.2 3 It is sobering to recog-
nize that, despite the impressive successes achieved by the legal
community's responses to 9/11, the efforts have fallen short.24 The
shortest portion of the Report is Part III, titled "Ongoing Efforts
and Unmet Needs. ' 25 In contrast to Parts I and II, covering over
twenty and thirty pages respectively, Part III consists of one-and-a-
half pages. Some of this is inevitable, as the Report focuses "on
the period of time from September 11, 2001 through approximately
the end of 2002.'126 As a result, the brevity of the reporting reflects
in part the dearth of information regarding the efforts after 2002,
which are beyond the scope of the Report. The Report notes the
continuing work of many of the pro bono and legal services organi-
zations that were involved from the outset of the crisis.27
The brevity of Part III, however, also reflects difficulties in sus-
taining the response and continuing to address unmet legal needs.2z
22. Kaye, Foreword, supra note 2, at 833.
23. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 928-30.
24. Id. at 907 (noting that although many needs continue to exist, the rush of legal
volunteers has diminished, resulting in difficulty in the staffing of certain relief
efforts).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. These organizations include the City Bar Fund, Legal Aid Society of New
York and Legal Services for New York ("LSNY"), among others. Id. Lawyers "con-
tinue to work on applications to the Victim Compensation fund, ongoing estate pro-
ceedings, workers' compensation issues, housing issues and dealing with continued
unemployment." Id. Legal services organizations "continue to actively reach out to
low income New Yorkers suffering adverse economic effects resulting from the down-
turn sparked by 9/11." Id.
28. See, e.g., infra notes 39-41 (discussing difficulties in sustaining the response of
the volunteer legal community to the crisis of homelessness).
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The Report describes three categories of legal needs that remain
unaddressed:
[T]hose who suffered economic harm from the fallout of 9/11
but lacked a sufficient nexus to the actual events of 9/11 to qual-
ify for economic assistance programs;
immigrants who suffered directly from the events of 9/11 (and
would qualify for such assistance) but who were afraid, because
of their immigration status, to come forward and take advantage
of the resources that were available to them; and
immigrants who were detained either immediately after 9/11 or
as a result of the special registration program implemented by
the government in response to 9/11.29
Legal needs also remain unmet because they arose, or were discov-
ered, later than the needs that were immediately evident in the
wake of the attack:
Later, organizations became more proactive, seeking to identify
needs that might not be fully recognized or appreciated and
seeking to reach out to those communities who had suffered but
not come forward on their own. Some needs arose only later,
either because of the extended economic downturn in new York
City that followed 9/11 or simply owing to the fact that many
needs only become evident after the passage of many months.3°
The more disturbing reason for the fact that legal needs remain
unmet is the shortage of volunteers.3' In stark contrast, the surge
in volunteers in the immediate aftermath of the attacks was over-
whelming.32 For example, on September 25, 2001, Mayor Guiliani
announced that volunteer lawyers would be needed to help survi-
vors apply for death certificates.3 3 More than 800 lawyers at-
tempted to attend a training session at the City Bar Association
scheduled within a day of the mayor's announcement.34 Since the
City Bar Association's largest conference room held 500 people,
roughly 300 volunteers were turned away from the initial training
session.
29. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 907; see also A Better Deal for Victims,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at A20 (explaining that as of March 6th, 2002, the Justice
Department had yet to agree to shield from prosecution the families and employers of
illegal aliens killed on September 11th).
30. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 907.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 840, 873.
33. Id. at 873.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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As the crisis fades from public view, "the rush of legal volunteers
has diminished."36 Applications to the Victim Compensation Fund
were due in December 2003, "yet a shortage of volunteer lawyers
was reported as the application deadline approached. '37 Accord-
ing to the City Bar, "where once lawyers competed for volunteer
opportunities, more recently it has been difficult to staff some
opportunities. 38
The difficulty of sustaining a response to a crisis is not unique to
the response to the September 11th crisis. For example, Maria Fos-
carinis offers a moving account of efforts to combat homeless-
ness.39 She describes how, in response to the growing crisis of
homelessness, advocates embarked on a campaign to achieve an
emergency federal legislative response to homelessness, which at
first achieved "immediate, positive results," but that "stasis ... fol-
lowed the initial success. ' 40
During the 1980's, there was an enormous outpouring of public
concern for the homeless. Newspaper articles carried frequent
features depicting the plight of particular individuals or families.
Concerned persons of all sorts volunteered to help. Lawyers be-
came involved, first in the courts, then in Congress.
But as homelessness persists, and continues to grow, there is a
tendency towards acceptance: What was originally perceived as
an intolerable crisis may be evolving into an accepted social
condition.41
Without belaboring differences between the crisis of homeless-
ness and the crisis created by the September 11th attacks, 42 the pat-
36. Id. at 907.
37. Id.
38. Id. Opportunities have been particularly difficult to staff where they involved
"a loss of income" or "requir[ed] special expertise ... such as workers' compensation
and landlord/tenant matters." Id.
39. Maria Foscarinis, Beyond Homelessness: Ethics, Advocacy, and Strategy, 12 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 37, 38 (1993).
40. Id. at 39.
41. Id. at 41-42.
42. For example, nothing in the legal community's response to the 9/11 crisis sug-
gests that community leaders employed a constrained definition of "crisis" in develop-
ing responses. In the context of the homelessness crisis, Susan Bennett illustrates how
policy-makers utilized strained definitions of the word "crisis" in crafting policies re-
lating not only to the crisis of homelessness, but to the connected problems related to
our welfare system and housing policies. Susan Bennett, Heartbreak Hotel. The Dis-
harmonious Convergence of Welfare, Housing and Homelessness, 1 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUEs 27, 30 (1990). Foscarinis identifies the "institutionalization" and "legi-
timization" of homelessness as part of the explanation of "stasis." Foscarinis, supra
note 39, at 39. Bennett adds that the policymakers avoided developing genuine solu-
tions to the deep-seated problems by resorting to tortured definitions of the language
988
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tern of a burst of organized activity involving all sorts of
volunteers, including lawyers, yielding initial positive results, but
giving way to stasis, is a pattern recognizable in the pages of the
September 11th Report. 43 In one respect, the continuation of un-
met legal needs presents a challenge for the legal community. To
the extent the legal community can achieve successes in meeting
the unmet needs away from the spotlight, after the crisis has faded
and after stasis has set in, the lessons may prove to be the most
useful primer of all.4 At the same time, however, the continuation
of unmet legal needs after 9/11 is a sobering reality.45 If the over-
whelming response to the 9/11 crisis fell short of meeting the needs,
then even greater hurdles will face efforts to address crises that
cannot be solved with an immediate burst of concentrated effort or
are perceived as crises of a lesser magnitude.
II. CRISIS OR DISASTER?
One of the Report's lessons is that "[p]eople responded when
they were asked to help."46 Yet, any effort to translate lessons
learned from the 9/11 response to other settings carries with it the
obvious limitation that the 9/11 crisis simply was unlike any other.47
In this respect, the unprecedented response by the legal commu-
nity described in the Report was paralleled by the response of
others across the country responding to the horrors of the attacks
of emergency and crisis. Bennett, supra note 42, at 30-33. The availability of "emer-
gency shelter" impedes the solution of crafting permanent housing solutions, despite
the fact the precipitating factor of the homelessness is loss of income or family crisis,
rather than an event such as a tornado or flood, and the "the 'emergency' state of
homelessness may last not for days, but months." Id. at 33-34. "The continuing fan-
tasy of treating dire need for housing as an 'emergency' has exposed the most vulnera-
ble of all applicants to the full force of all the inequities arising from the states'
inconsistent interpretations" of benefits and housing programs. Id. at 34.
43. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 907.
44. See id. (explaining that many lawyers who got involved in the legal relief effort
early on do continue to work on applications to the Victim Compensation Fund,
ongoing estate proceedings, workers' compensation issues, housing issues and efforts
to cope with continued unemployment).
45. See id. (noting that a shortage of volunteer lawyers was reported as the appli-
cation deadline for the Victim Compensation Fund approached and that "the rush of
legal volunteers has diminished").
46. Id. at 930, 937 (setting this principle out a lesson to be taken from the 9/11
relief effort).
47. Id. at 840 ("The attacks on September 11, 2001 were unprecedented in scope,
and the legal needs that grew out of the attacks were.., far-reaching."); Schmemann,
supra note 1, at Al (noting that "in the immediate aftermath [of September 11th,] the
calamity was already being ranked the worst and most audacious terror attack in
American history").
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on the Twin Towers.48 Countless reports documented the extent to
which doctors, nurses, firefighters, policemen, and legions of others
were catalyzed into action in the wake of the attacks, volunteering
their time, effort and skills.49 In terms of financial donations, "Sep-
tember 11th evoked an avalanche of philanthropic feelings and
charitable giving., 5
0
Eighty-five percent of the individual lawyers who volunteered
indicated that they did so because "they wanted to help."' 51 Re-
lated reasons included the fact that it felt like "the right thing to
do" and it felt like the best way to "help victims." ' 52 In the moving
words of one volunteer, "[l]ike many people, I just felt the need to
help in any way possible. '53 Pro bono work seemed to be the most
effective outlet for many volunteers, although one noted that "[i]n
48. "[I]n the United States, in the after-math of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, victims
and their families received an outpouring of legal and other assistance, fueled partly
by a desire to demonstrate national strength and solidarity." Deborah L. Rhode, Pro
Bono in Principle and Practice, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 413, 418-19 (2003).
49. See, e.g., Sally Jenkins, New York's Men of Steel: Hard Hats, Soft Hearts,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2001, at C01 ("They tramp into the smoke and dust, a legion of
volunteer laborers wearing hard hats and tool belts and thick-soled boots."); Mirta
Ojito, After the Attacks: The Volunteers; Lending Everything From Ears to Elbow
Grease, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at All (explaining that after the September llth
attacks "volunteers came [to New York] by the hundreds.... [and] lined up for hours
at Red Cross headquarters on the West Side, at the Jacob K. Javits Convention
Center, at hospitals, blood banks, and police command posts, offering themselves for
whatever was needed"); Edward Walsh, National Response to Terror: FEMA Leads
Effort; Borders Tightened, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A23 (reporting that the
Department of Health and Human Services "authorized an emergency shipment of
medical supplies to New York and, for the first time since it was created, activated a
national medical emergency system that would make about 7,000 volunteer doctors,
nurses, pharmacists, and other medical personnel available in the attack areas"); Ed-
ward Walsh, Volunteers Find It Hard to Join Rescue Efforts; New York Turns Away
Help, Food Offers, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2001, at A50 ("Since terror and disaster
struck the World Trade Center[,] ... hundreds if not thousands of people ... have
poured into this city desperately wanting to help. They joined thousands of New
Yorkers who had the same thing in mind. The outpouring of volunteers has been
astounding...").
50. Catalogue for Philanthropy, Generosity in 2001, at http://www.catalogueforphil
anthropy.org/cfp/generosity-index/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Catalogue
for Philanthropy, Generosity in 2001]; see also Catalogue for Philanthropy, The Gen-
erosity Index: 2003 (2001 US State Data), at http://www.catalogueforphilan thropy.org/
cfp/db/generosity.php?year=2003 (last visited Apr. 28, 2004); see also Rob Varnon,
Businesses Offering Charity on 9-11; Firms Mark Tragic Day with Giving; Helping
Others is Theme of Practical Donations, CONN. POST (Bridgeport), Sept. 10, 2003, § M
(discussing diverse initiatives on the part of the business community to commemorate
the anniversary of the September 11th attacks with charitable efforts and donations).
51. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 908.
52. Id. at 912 (fifty-seven percent and fifty-nine percent listed these reasons,
respectively).
53. Id.
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the days right after the tragedy, I would have traded in my law
degree for experience in rescue operations in a heartbeat. 54
The Report underscores the uniqueness of the 9/11 attack, with
the Executive Summary opening with the observation that the "at-
tacks on September 11, 2001 were unprecedented in scope."55 That
the unprecedented attack yielded an unprecedented response by
the legal community is in retrospect not surprising. It also suggests
that a problem perceived as a lesser crisis can be expected to pro-
voke a lesser response.
Even a subtle shift in semantics as the Report unfolds under-
scores the uniqueness of the situation.56 The Report is titled "Pub-
lic Service in a Time of Crisis", and Chief Judge Kaye builds on the
word "crisis" to refer to the daily crises, facing countless families,
that also cry out for assistance from the legal community.57 By the
"Lessons Learned" section of the Report, however, the word "cri-
sis" has been replaced by "disaster. '58 Lessons eight through six-
teen, therefore, are organized under the category of "Responding
to a Disaster. 59
While the shift in language may be more semantic than substan-
tive, the fact of a single, visible, triggering event sets this crisis
apart from others. The nature and extent of the response clearly
was affected by the fact that the disaster was triggered by a horrific,
one-time event, occurring on a single day, and reported through
the mass media as the disaster unfolded.60 This reality will affect
the applicability of lessons learned to other crises. The less dra-
matic and visible a particular crisis, and the less it is triggered by a
single event, the less there will be an outpouring of response. 61 A
54. Id. at 846. The survey response continues: "[w]hen the opportunity came to
help the families of the victims, and to help them in a legal role, I jumped at it." Id.
55. Id. at 840.
56. See infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
57. Kaye, Foreword, supra note 2, at 833 ("[T]he fact is that for families facing
homelessness, or eviction, or deportation, or foster care, or innumerable other life
challenges, every day is also a time of crisis.").
58. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 927-38.
59. Id. at 927.
60. E.g., supra notes 1, 49 (listing various newspaper accounts of the September
11th attack and the ensuing volunteer efforts).
61. See, e.g., Foscarinis, supra note 39, at 39 (discussing difficulties in sustaining
the response of the volunteer legal community to the crisis of homelessness); see also
infra notes 133, 185-187 and accompanying text (discussing the shortage of volunteers
for pro bono initiatives and efforts to foster an increase in such volunteer
involvement).
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smaller response to a different crisis in turn means that fewer re-
sources are available for handling that crisis.62
The trigger of a single event was crucial to the swiftness of the
response.63 The first lesson listed in the section under Responding
to a Disaster is: "Swift action following 9/11 was vital to maximiz-
ing volunteerism and cooperation. '"64 Quick action was crucial be-
cause in "the immediate aftermath of the tragic events of 9/11,
levels of volunteerism and cooperation within the legal community
soared," and, by acting quickly, the New York "legal community
effectively harnessed these forces to the tremendous benefit of
those affected by 9/11.65 Absent a visible, triggering event, there
will not be so obvious a moment at which levels of volunteerism
and cooperation will be at their highest. With lower levels of
volunteerism and cooperation in response to crises that fall far
short of the 9/11 disaster, the mobilization challenge facing the
public service community will be formidable.66
III. THE DANGER OF DIVERSION
A third question regarding the successes of the legal commu-
nity's response to the September 11th attacks is whether the
human and financial resources mobilized in response to the attacks
were new resources or resources diverted from other endeavors.67
In the area of charitable giving, for example, it is undisputed that
there was a surge in giving in response to the attacks.68 By some
accounts, however, Americans gave generously to attack relief
62. See generally ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 936 (discussing the im-
portance of timely and adequate funding to community relief efforts); Curtis Krieger,
Donations to Local Charities Slow in Months After Attacks, ST. PETERSBURc TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2002 (discussing the adverse effect of September 11th generosity on funds
available for donation to non-9/11 charitable organizations), available at http://
www.sptimes.com/2002/09/04/91 1/Donations to localch.shtml.
63. See ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 933.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See infra notes 133, 185-187 and accompanying text (discussing the shortage of
volunteers for pro bono initiatives and efforts to foster an increase in such volunteer
involvement).
67. See ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 847.
68. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, Ground Zero: Charity; A Flood of Money, Then a
Deluge of Scrutiny for Those Handing it Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at B5
("Never has so much money been raised with so little effort."); Varnon, supra note 50
(discussing business community efforts to commemorate the anniversary of the Sep-
tember 11th attacks with charitable efforts and donations); Catalogue for Philan-
thropy, Generosity in 2001, supra note 50 (noting that "the catastrophe of September
11th evoked strong philanthropic response").
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funds in lieu of their traditional donations to other organizations.69
Other accounts indicate that the decline in giving occurred later
and was due instead to a downturn in the economy.70
The question of whether legal resources in response to 9/11 were
diverted from other endeavors is a delicate one. To the extent re-
sources were diverted, the individual and organizational decisions
leading to those diversions were wholly justifiable and predictable
given the nature of the disaster. Indeed, it would have been sur-
prising and disturbing if large sectors of the legal community con-
tinued as if nothing had happened in the aftermath of the attacks.
Despite the delicate nature of the inquiry, it is important to under-
stand which resources marshaled in response to the 9/11 disaster
were diverted from other endeavors and which were new re-
sources. The answer to that question requires an exploration of
which endeavors may have suffered while resources were mobil-
ized after the attacks.
Ironically, as the planes were crashing into the two towers, a col-
laborative effort was unfolding in the form of New York's first ever
Access to Justice Conference, scheduled to be held in Albany, New
York on September 11 and 12, 2001.7 1 As the Report reflects, the
situation at the Conference changed radically when the conference
planners learned of the terrorist attacks.72 Judge Juanita Bing
Newton, Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for Justice Initiatives,
under whose leadership the conference was organized, decided to
go ahead with the Conference despite the attacks and approxi-
mately two thirds of the scheduled participants remained in Albany
at the Conference. 73 Representatives of various New York City
bar associations and legal services organizations met during a
69. See ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 847; Krieger, supra note 62 (noting
that charitable donations to 9/11 relief efforts came at the expense of donations to
organizations whose charitable focus was elsewhere, such as with domestic violence
prevention).
70. See, e.g., Sheryl Homan, Charitable Giving was Good Despite Sept. 11 (Aug. 1,
2002), at http://www.businessnorth.com/viewarticle.asp?articleid=523 (last visited May
14, 2004).
Many nonprofit organizations believe money contributed at a local level last
year was down due to the events of 9-11. Believe it or not, charitable giving
actually increased in 2001, according to the annual 'Giving USA' report re-
leased recently by the American Association of Fundraising Council.
Granted, the increases weren't at the levels of prior years, but giving was
well within the norm for a recession.
Id.
71. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 843.
72. Id.
73. Id.
2004]
994 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
break in the conference and "turned their attention to helping
those impacted by the attacks. '7 4 The Conference therefore pro-
vided an immediate opportunity for members of the legal commu-
nity to begin the collaboration that yielded the impressive response
to the attacks.75
The Conference had its own agenda, however, which was impos-
ing enough absent the September 11th attacks. The Conference
was designed to bring to reality the concept of Access to Justice in
the New York Court system.76 In the words of Wilhelm Joseph,
one of the speakers in the opening plenary, the New York courts
and courts throughout the country are struggling with a "serious
crisis in justice. ' 77 Mr. Joseph discussed the need to create "a sense
of urgency that action must to be taken to achieve our constitu-
tional mandate to establish justice. '78 In her comments prepared
for the Conference, Chief Judge Kaye observed: "It is appalling for
me as chief judge to see how small a percentage of the civil legal
needs of the poor in this country are being met, a statistic that may
decline even further with the economy. 79
The Conference agenda included a variety of panels addressing
aspects of the Access to Justice challenge. 0 Some focused on the
players in the system, discussing challenges facing civil legal ser-
vices, the law schools, the Judiciary and pro bono organizations.81
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Margaret Martin Barry, Access to Justice: On Dialogues with the Judiciary, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1089 (2002) (quoting Wilhelm Joseph, Executive Director,
Legal Aid Bureau of Md., Inc, Remarks at New York State Unified Court System
Access to Justice Conference (Sept. 11, 2001)).
78. Id.
79. Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge, New York State Court of Appeals, Remarks
Prepared for New York State Unified Court System Access to Justice Conference
(Sept. 11, 2001), in 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1081, 1081 (2002) [hereinafter Kaye, Re-
marks]. In a small, but appropriate example of diversion, Chief Judge Kaye did not
actually deliver her prepared remarks at the Conference, opting instead to deliver a
moving address expressing her sadness and horror after the terrorist attacks.
80. Agenda, New York State Unified Court System Access to Justice Conference
(Sept. 11-12, 2001) (on file with author). The articles written for the Access to Justice
Conference were compiled by this law journal and appear in a previous issue. Confer-
ence, New York State Unified Court System Access to Justice, in 29 FORDHAM URB. L.
J. 1081, 1081-1348 (2002).
81. Agenda, supra note 80; see also Barry, supra note 77, at 1089-90; Robert M.
Elardo, Equal Protection Denied in New York to Some Family Law Litigants in Su-
preme Court: An Assigned Counsel Dilemma for the Courts, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1125, 1125-31 (2002); Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for Low-Income Per-
sons: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1213, 1213-17
(2002); Deborah Howard, The Law School Consortium Project: Law Schools Support-
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Others focused on innovations, including access through technol-
ogy,82 new court initiatives, 83 and unbundled legal services. 84 Some
targeted specific settings, such as Family Court 85 or legal services in
Rural Communities,86 while others tackled systemic issues, as re-
flected in the titles of "Communicating: Making Access Possible by
Overcoming Cultural, Language and Literacy Barriers," and "Self-
Represented Litigants are Here to Stay.- 87
Almost three years after the twin events of the terrorist attacks
and the Access to Justice Conference, none of the panels would be
superfluous were a similar conference held today. The problems
that led to the Conference in 2001 persist, and likely were exacer-
bated by a downturn in the economy that increased the legal needs
of the poor and contributed to a shrinking availability of legal ser-
vices.88 Whether the problems were pushed to the back-burner as
the legal community responded to the attacks cannot be discerned
from the Report. In the short run, it is fair to assume that tasks
undertaken with existing resources diverted resources from other
endeavors.8 9 For example, Lesson 5 of the Report is that the public
interest legal services was a vital contributor to the 9/11 legal relief
effort.90 The details of the "Specific Projects Designed to Aid Vic-
ing Graduates to Increase Access to Justice for Low and Moderate-Income Individuals
and Communities, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1245, 1245-47 (2002).
82. Agenda, supra note 80; see also Frances H. Thompson, Access to Justice in
Idaho, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1313, 1314-15 (2002).
83. Agenda, supra note 80; see also Margot Lindsay & Mary K. Shilton, The Pub-
lic is Willing, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1267, 1267-71 (2002); Tina L. Rasnow, Traveling
Justice: Providing Court Based Pro Se Assistance to Limited Access Communities, 29
FORDHAM URB. 1281, 1281-82 (2002).
84. Agenda, supra note 80; see also Hon. Fern Fisher-Brandveen & Rochelle
Klempner, Unbundled Legal Services: Untying the Bundle in New York State, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1107, 1107-11 (2002); Jona Goldschmidt, In Defense of Ghost-
writing, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1145, 1145 (2002) [hereinafter Goldschmidt,
Ghostwriting].
85. Agenda, supra note 80; see also Elardo, supra note 81, at 1125-31.
86. Agenda, supra note 80; see also Rasnow, supra note 83, at 1281-82; Thompson,
supra note 82, at 1313-15.
87. Agenda, supra note 80.
88. See, e.g., David W. Chen, Boom Times in the City's Housing Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2003, at B1 (explaining that New York City's Housing Court, which
generally serves some of the city's poorest tenants has seen a rapid rise in middle-class
litigants and noting that "the changing face of housing court . . . is but one more
graphic, often terribly sad reflection of the city's stumbling economy"). The article
also notes that Legal Aid and Legal Services, which should be available to help those
with inadequate resources, are both pressed for funds. Id.
89. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 847 ("Projects to assist those affected
by 9/11 . . . occupied staff and depleted other resources from the organizing
agencies.").
90. Id. at 927, 932.
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tims" are replete with examples in which legal services organiza-
tions played a direct role in the delivery of legal services, or
dedicated resources to the training of volunteers. 91 With legal ser-
vices organizations facing cuts nationally and locally, absent evi-
dence that these activities were funded by new monies, resources
likely were diverted from other endeavors.92
Similarly, the volunteer efforts from the private bar represented
a mix of new and existing resources. 93 "People who were new to
pro bono work volunteered in large numbers."94 TWenty-two per-
cent of the volunteers had not volunteered previously and thirty
percent had spent no more than twenty-five hours in the past on
pro bono matters,95 suggesting that a significant portion of the pro
bono resources leveraged were new resources. Other volunteers,
however, had a pattern of performing pro bono work,96 and their
pro bono efforts likely occurred in lieu of other pro bono work
they would have performed. The training resources committed by
the private bar also came, in part, at the expense of training dedi-
cated to other pro bono endeavors.97
Since it was inevitable and appropriate that human and financial
resources would be diverted in response to the 9/11 disaster, the
more important assessment becomes the extent to which existing
resources were diverted and the extent to which new resources
were leveraged. Where the legal community succeeded in leverag-
ing new resources, it is important to understand the process so that
the lessons of this experience can lead to the leveraging of new
resources to address future crises.98 It is also important to insure
that pro bono and financial resources made available for the first
91. See, e.g., id. at 868, 875-76 (discussing Legal Aid and the Legal Services Help
Desk). "Nonprofit and legal service organizations participated in every aspect of the
legal relief effort. Lawyers .. .helped thousands of clients devastated by 9/11 and
trained and advised volunteer lawyers from the private sector ...." Id. at 845.
92. See id. at 847. Some of the activities were in fact funded by the philanthropic
community, and legal aid organizations were among the recipients of the financial
assistance. Id. Indeed, as Lesson 13 reflects, funding was essential. Id. at 936. None-
theless, projects organized by the legal organizations "occupied staff and depleted
other resources from the organizing agencies. This depletion coincided with reduc-
tions in their own incomes from contributions due to the economic fallout of 9/11."
Id. at 847.
93. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
94. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 908.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 845, 850-51.
98. See id. at 927, 36 (discussing, in Lesson 13, how fundamental timely funding is
to disaster relief efforts).
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time will continue to be utilized to address the plethora of unmet
legal needs as the 9/11 crisis fades.99 Finally, it is important to un-
derstand and replicate the innovations developed, and the patterns
of collaboration that emerged, in the response to the 9/11 at-
tacks.100 Where the innovations and collaborations produced a
more efficient or effective delivery of legal services, those successes
should be viewed as off-setting resources that were diverted. The
analysis of resources leveraged and utilized therefore becomes
most important as part of the inquiry into the larger question of
whether the lessons learned from the aftermath of September 11th
can be applied to other crises.
IV. APPLYING THE LESSONS LEARNED: ONE CRISIS
If the Report is to serve as a primer for a legal community, we
should apply the lessons of the response to September 11th to
other settings. We should do so while recognizing the difficulties
identified in the preceding sections: that even the massive 9/11 re-
sponse proved inadequate in some respects and that significant
hurdles impede efforts to apply the lessons of September 11th to
problems perceived as lesser crises.10 ' Since it was the topic of Ac-
cess to Justice in the New York Court System that was symbolically
pushed aside in the wake of the attacks,1°2 we should begin apply-
ing the lessons learned from the 9/11 response to that setting.
Within the topic of Access to Justice, one of the most difficult
problems is the routine forfeiture of important legal rights by the
unrepresented poor in civil proceedings. 0 3 It is widely docu-
mented that unrepresented litigants are flooding the courts. 10 4 Un-
99. See id. at 907.
100. See id. at 927-38 (enumerating the lessons learned from an analysis of the legal
community's response to September 11th, in the hopes that they might provide gui-
dance for future relief efforts).
101. See id. at 907; supra note 61 and accompanying text.
102. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 845; supra notes 71-87 and accompany-
ing text.
103. For a more detailed exploration of the issues raised in the next two
paragraphs, see Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented
Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
1987, 1987-90 (1999) [hereinafter Engler, And Justice for All].
104. Id. at 1987; e.g., Goldschmidt, Ghostwriting, supra note 84, at 1145 ("The in-
creased presence of pro se litigants in the court .... can be attributed to the high cost
of litigation, anti-lawyer sentiment, and the advent of do-it-yourself law kits, books,
and web sites."); Thompson, supra note 82, at 1315 (noting the abundance of pro se
litigants and attributing this phenomenon to, inter alia, the fact that "the demand for
attorneys exceed[s] the supply" and the fact that "many attorneys do not practice the
kinds of law that are useful to the self-represented").
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represented litigants raise significant issues for judges, mediators,
clerks, represented parties, and opposing counsel alike.1 °5 Yet, in
the context of an Access to Justice analysis, the difficulties facing
those players in the court system pale in comparison to the difficul-
ties facing many unrepresented litigants. 106 On a daily basis, all
around the country, unrepresented litigants forfeit important rights
not because of the applicable law or facts of their cases, but due to
the absence of counsel. 10 7
A hallmark of our adversary system is the promise of neutrality
and impartiality. 108 Yet, the roles of the players in the adversary
system are defined by rules that assume that parties to litigation
are represented by counsel. 0 9 Where cases involve only unrepre-
sented litigants, they challenge the adversary system.1 0 Where
cases pit unrepresented litigants against represented ones, the ad-
versary system breaks down. 11' All too often in these settings, the
mere presence of counsel for one side, and not the governing law
as applied to the facts, controls the outcome. 112
A system in which an unrepresented litigant may forfeit impor-
tant rights due to the absence of counsel fails to uphold the prom-
ise of neutrality, fairness, and justice. 13 Wilhelm Joseph, speaking
at the opening plenary of the Access to Justice Conference, re-
ferred to this reality in asserting that the New York courts and
courts throughout the country are struggling with a "serious crisis
in justice." '114 Building on Mr. Joseph's comments, Professor Mar-
garet Martin Barry wrote in the Symposium Issue for the Access to
Justice Conference:
At a time when our country is experiencing a renewed sense of
patriotism and is speaking with conviction about precepts that
distinguish the Nation, [Mr. Joseph's] reference to this essential
mandate is all the more poignant. Central to our democracy is a
belief that our legal system is just. This faith has been sorely
tested by the experiences of many who seek judicial relief. Peo-
105. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 103, at 1987-90.
106. See id. at 1988-89.
107. Id. at 1989.
108. See id. at 2022-24.
109. Id. at 2022.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2023.
113. See id.; see also Barry, supra note 77, at 1089.
114. Barry, supra note 77, at 1089 (quoting Wilhelm Joseph, Executive Director,
Legal Aid Bureau of Md., Inc, Remarks at New York State Unified Court System
Access to Justice Conference (Sept. 11, 2001)).
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pie enter a system dependent on lawyers whom they often do
not trust and more often cannot afford. The legal system has
not been structured to accommodate those without professional
help. After years of managing unrepresented litigants who do
not get justice, there is a growing concern that the movement
has subsumed the central mission of the courts. Many of those
involved are becoming disillusioned. 1 5
Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., one of the Keynote Speakers at the Ac-
cess to Justice Conference, spoke of the need for adoption of a
"Civil Gideon" to address the problem of the unrepresented liti-
gants in the courts.'" 6 Chief Judge Kaye highlighted the issue of
unmet legal needs in civil cases by placing the topic at the begin-
ning of her remarks both for the Access to Justice Conference and
the 9/11 Report:
It is appalling for me as chief judge to see how small a percent-
age of the civil legal needs of the poor in this country are being
met .... 117
But the fact is that for families facing homelessness, or eviction,
or deportation, or foster care, or innumerable other life chal-
lenges, every day is also a time of crisis.
18
On the one hand, there already is widespread recognition of the
crisis regarding the unrepresented poor.11 9 On the other hand, as
Wilhelm Joseph points out, we still must "creat[e] a sense of ur-
gency . . . to achieve our constitutional mandate to establish jus-
tice."' 120  No terrorist attack triggered this crisis. The
unrepresented poor have faced insurmountable barriers in the le-
gal system from its inception.121 Viewed from one perspective, the
115. Id.
116. Agenda, supra note 80. A "Civil Gideon" refers to the appointment of coun-
sel in civil cases, paralleling the right to counsel in criminal cases established in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963). For a more detailed description of
Justice Johnson's views, see Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., Will Gideon's Trumpet Sound a
New Meldoy? The Globalization of Constitutional Values and Its Implications for a
Right to Equal Justice in Civil Cases, 2 SEATTLE U.J. Soc. JusT. 201 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Johnson, Jr., Will Gideon's Trumpet Sound?; Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Ac-
cess to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United States and Other Industrial
Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 83, 83-88 (2000) [hereinafter Johnson, Jr., Equal
Access to Justice] (reproduced in the materials circulated at the Access to Justice
Conference).
117. Kaye, Remarks, supra note 79, at 1081.
118. Kaye, Foreword, supra note 2, at 833.
119. See Barry, supra note 77, at 1089; Johnson, Equal Access to Justice, supra note
116, at 83-88; Kaye, Remarks, supra note 79, at 1081.
120. See Barry, supra note 77, at 1089.
121. See id.; Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 103, at 2022-24.
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problem is exacerbated as the number of unrepresented poor
surges and overwhelms the legal system.122 Viewed from another,
it is only the acknowledgment and perception of the problem that
are new.12 3 Unlike the crisis in homelessness, it does not seem as if
a concentrated campaign yielding initial results has given way to
stasis.12 4 More accurately, the problem has been institutionalized
and legitimized in the United States from the outset.12 5 We remain
a century behind our counterparts in Western Europe in our ap-
proach to civil needs of the unrepresented poor.1 26
If the legal community treats the topics of access to justice and
the unrepresented poor as a problem short of a crisis, the "Report
of the Legal Community's Response to the Events of September
11, 2001" will provide little guidance. As more players in the sys-
tem recognize or are persuaded that the crisis is real, then the
pages of the Report are rich with lessons that can be learned and
applied. The solutions demand that those in the legal system re-
spond as a community.127 Collaboration among a plethora of insti-
tutions is fundamental; central coordination, coupled with wide
collaboration and participation, will magnify the effectiveness of
the community's response.1 28 Individual projects can be operated
and controlled by their own sponsoring organizations, while at the
same time coordinated centrally.129 The public interest legal ser-
122. Cf Goldschmidt, Ghostwriting, supra note 84, at 1145 (noting that the demand
for legal assistance is unmet in the face of an "increased presence of pro se litigants in
the court .... [which] can be attributed to the high cost of litigation, anti-lawyer
sentiment, and the advent of do-it-yourself law kits, books, and web sites.").
123. See Johnson, Equal Access to Justice, supra note 116, at 85-86, 99 (commenting
on the extent to which the number of unrepresented litigants in the United States
overwhelms the resources allocated for their assistance and noting that this problem
has persisted for decades). "To borrow a health services analogy, the United States is
in a 'triage' situation-indeed one of 'extreme triage'-trying to pick the relative few
poor people to which its limited legal service resource will be able to offer a free
lawyer." Id. at 99.
124. Compare id. at 85-86, 99 (explaining that the American justice system has been
underestimating its failure to provide its poor with truly "equal access to justice" for
decades), with Foscarinis, supra note 39, at 39 (explaining that after generating some
interest in the legal community in abating the crisis of homelessness, those campaign-
ing for the cause found it difficult to sustain effective levels of volunteerism and
concern).
125. See Johnson, Equal Access to Justice, supra note 116, at 85-86.
126. See id. at 89 ("Most other Western European countries, like the United King-
dom, enacted a statutory right to counsel in civil cases over a century, or at least
decades, ago.").
127. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 927-32.
128. See id. at 927-30.
129. Id. (noting that this structure "contributed to the effectiveness of the [9/11]
relief effort").
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vices community is a vital and central contributor, and significant
contributions will come from non-lawyers in the legal commu-
nity. 130 Pro bono lawyers must play a major role; they will need to
be mobilized, trained, and supported by technological innova-
tions.1 3 ' Law students and law schools eagerly participated in the
9/11 relief efforts;132 they must be involved in Access to Justice ef-
forts to provide assistance in the short run and to foster public ser-
vice in future lawyers. 133 Every element of the legal community
has a role to play.13 1
Alan Houseman, who moderated a panel on civil legal services
at the New York Access to Justice Conference, calls for "A Com-
prehensive Integrated System" to ensure "equal justice under the
law for low-income persons.' 35 The elements of the comprehen-
sive integrated system are consistent with the lessons learned from
the legal community's response to the 9/11 crisis. 136 According to
Houseman, the comprehensive system must: 1) provide access to
civil legal assistance; 2) provide a full range of services; 3) use a full
130. Id. at 932 (noting that "[sleveral of the 9/11 relief projects made effective use
of nonlawyers from within the legal community").
131. Id. (explaining that "[flully utilizing technology and online pro bono communi-
ties made volunteering easier and brought in many volunteers with little prior pro
bono experience").
132. Id. at 898-99. "Each law school found a unique way for its students and
professors to contribute to the [9/11] legal relief effort." Id.
133. For example, Professor Margaret Martin Barry and Deborah Howard were
among the speakers at the New York Access to Justice Conference on the panel titled
"Law Schools: Fostering Public Service in Future Lawyers." Agenda, supra note 80.
Professor Barry's published comments in the Symposium Issue following the Confer-
ence examine "what insight [law school] clinical programs can offer to the judiciary on
making the courts more accessible to the public" in an effort "to encourage more
dialogue between the judiciary and law school faculty involved with the courts."
Barry, supra note 77, at 1090. Deborah Howard's article for the Symposium Issue
discusses the Law School Consortium Project, as a mechanism for law schools to in-
crease access to justice for law and moderate income communities. Howard, supra
note 81, at 1245-47. Professor Deborah L. Rhode has recently published the results of
a comprehensive, national survey of the factors influencing pro bono work, which
"suggest changes in workplace and law school cultures that can more effectively trans-
late public service principles into professional practices." Rhode, supra note 48, at
414. The article includes a specific section dedicated to an empirical analysis of law
school pro bono programs, and the agenda for reform involves specific practices that
could be developed for law schools. Rhode, supra note 48, at 454-62.
134. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 932.
135. Houseman, supra note 81, at 1233.
136. Compare id. at 1233-42 (providing a series of suggestions aimed at achieving
"[flundamental change in civil legal assistance delivery"), with ABCNY FUND, ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 927 (enumerating eighteen lessons learned from "the 9/11 legal re-
sponse" in hopes that they "will be an instructive example for future legal relief
efforts").
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range of providers; 4) involve collaboration with human services
providers; 5) ensure statewide coordination of and support for
providers of civil legal assistance; and 6) involve national coordina-
tion and support for civil legal assistance providers.137
The coordinated response must include the reshaping of atti-
tudes in understanding the problem in the first place. 38 The entire
legal community must rededicate itself to the notion that the goal
of the legal system is to provide fairness and justice, not simply in
process but in outcomes as well. 139 We must accept the reality that
many unrepresented litigants do not "choose" to appear without
counsel, but are forced to do so due to a shortage of available and
affordable legal services.14 We must recognize that the existing
roles of the players in the legal system were developed in a world
that assumed that parties would be represented by counsel.' 4'
Where the traditional roles impede, rather than further the goal of
justice, we must alter the roles rather than abandon the goal.14 2 We
must revisit the roles of judges, court-connected mediators, clerks
and other court personnel not only to permit, but to require them
to carry out their duties in a manner that protects litigants from the
forfeiture of important legal rights due to the absence of counsel. 1
43
The legal community must understand and accept that the concept
of impartiality is not equated with passivity. 144 Impartiality re-
quires the active participation of neutral players to avoid the forfei-
ture of rights. 4 '
I have set forth elsewhere a more detailed exploration of these
principles and the implications for the particular roles of judges,
137. Houseman, supra note 81, at 1233-42. The first element, providing access to
civil legal assistance, involves: a) coordinated service delivery connecting all provid-
ers; b) coordinated advice and brief services; c) accessible intake systems; and d) a
gateway to state civil legal assistance systems. Id. at 1234-36.
138. See, e.g., Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 103, at 1988 (advocating "a
fundamental re-examination by the judiciary of the roles of judges, mediators, and
clerks in cases involving unrepresented litigants").
139. See id. at 1990 ("A system in which represented parties routinely prevail over
unrepresented parties-without regard to the merits of the case-cannot be viewed as
fair or impartial.")
140. Id. at 1988, 2027.
141. Id. at 2022.
142. Id. at 2022-23.
143. Id. at 1990, 2042.
144. See id. at 2023 ("The notion that a court cannot provide extensive assistance to
one party without compromising its impartiality must be rejected. To the contrary, a
court may need to provide more help to one side than to the other to maintain the
impartiality of the proceeding.").
145. See id. at 2023-24.
1002
2004] PUBLIC SERVICE AFTER 9/11 1003
court-connected mediators and clerks.146  Professor Jona Gold-
schmidt, in his subsequently published comments at the Access to
Justice Conference, underscores the need for a shift in attitude and
approach by those inside the court system. 147 According to Profes-
sor Goldschmidt, "judges should not be rigidly passive; rather, they
should provide pro se litigants... 'reasonable judicial assistance' as
an entitlement of living in a democracy and as a matter of constitu-
tional right. 14
8
As with the coordinated, collaborative response to 9/11, judges
from the New York State court system, led by the Chief Judge, will
play crucial roles in responding to New York's crisis of the unrep-
resented poor, spearheading initiatives to motivate those outside
the court system and playing a central role in formulating specific
plans within the court system. 1 49 The courts must lead the efforts
to reshape the roles of the players inside the court system as well as
the attitudes of those in the larger legal community, by building on
146. Id. at 2021-47 (examining, in Part II of the article, "the roles of the judges,
court personnel, and other players to demonstrate how they can and should provide
the necessary assistance" to unrepresented litigants).
147. Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting
the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 45-46 (2002) [herein-
after Goldschmidt, Pro Se Litigant's Struggle].
148. Id. at 43. Prof. Goldschmidt articulates five proposals for reform:
1. The Court Should Train Court Staff to Provide Basic Legal Information
to the Public[;]
2. Pretrial Conferences Should Be Conducted by Court Staff or Judicial
Personnel to Prepare the Litigants for Trial[;]
3. Judges Should Be Authorized to Provide Reasonable Assistance to Pro
Se Litigants and Facilitate the Introduction of Their Evidence[;]
4. Judges Should Be Permitted to Ask Questions, Call Witnesses, and Con-
duct Limited Independent Investigations[;]
5. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence Should Be Relaxed in Cases In-
volving Pro Se Litigants[.]
Id. at 46-53. Professor Goldschmidt advocates that the basic information to be pro-
vided by court staff involve "elements of common causes of action, defenses, statutes
of limitations, and such procedural requirements as those for service of process and
execution of judgment." Id. at 46.
149. See, e.g., ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 843 ("[E]ven before the
events of September 11, 2001, the courts were advancing a collaborative effort by the
legal community to respond to the tremendous need for legal services by the poor and
disadvantaged."); Kaye, Foreword, supra note 2, at 833 (reminding attorneys that
while 9/11 was certainly a "disaster,.... for families facing homelessness, or eviction,
or deportation, or foster care, or innumerable other life challenges, every day is also a
time of crisis").
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the ideas from the Access to Justice Conference and working
through the Office of the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for
Justice Initiatives.5 0 Similar to the 9/11 response, changes must in-
volve court procedures151 and ethical rules.152 Ethical rules involv-
ing lay advocacy, ghostwriting, limited assistance programs and
unbundled legal services remain as impediments to many access to
justice initiatives. 153 Each tool at the disposal of the courts must be
150. See ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 843.
151. For example, one part of the coordinated response to the problems of small
businesses harmed by 9/11 and facing commercial lease issues was the creation of a
separate docket and recruiting of volunteers by the Administrative Judge of the Civil
Court, the Hon. Fern Fisher. Id. at 895. Professor Goldschmidt's article illustrates a
number of procedural changes that could be implemented. Goldschmidt, Pro Se Liti-
gant's Struggle, supra note 147, at 46-53. In a similar vein, Professor Barry proposes
that the following components be included in plans of courts addressing access to
justice: "[1)] Clear Guidelines for Handling Pro Se Cases[;] .... [2)] Clear Guidelines
for Clerks on How to Assist Litigants[;] .... [3)] Consider the Role Lay Advocates
Can Play in Assisting Pro Se Litigants[;] .... [4)] Help Pro Bono Triage Efforts by
Acknowledging Pro Bono Attorneys' Time Constraints[;] and .... [5)] Seek Input
from the Public." Barry, supra note 77, at 1102-05. Recent articles have also explored
procedural changes in the federal courts, in the Eastern and Southern Districts of
New York, in an effort to increase access to justice for unrepresented litigants. Hon.
Lois Bloom & Helen Hirshkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se,
Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 475, 494-99 (2002) (explaining
procedural changes made in the Eastern District of New York); Jonathan D. Rosen-
bloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness in Pro Se Cases: A
Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 305, 328-35 (2002) (explaining procedural changes made in the Southern District
of New York).
152. See ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 927.
153. The Report itself specifically urges adoption of ABA Model Rules of Profl
Conduct R. 6.5 (2001), involving limited assistance programs, "to remove unnecessary
disciplinary impediments" to the efforts to provide pro bono assistance. Id. at 60.
The Access to Justice Symposium Issue includes articles focusing on ghostwriting and
unbundled legal services. Fisher-Brandveen & Klempner, supra note 84, at 1107-11;
Goldschmidt, Ghostwriting, supra note 84, at 1145-46. For the recommendations and
report on the topic of limited assistance, developed at the 1998 Conference held at
Fordham University School of Law, see Recommendations of the Conference on the
Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1751, 1774-
78 (1999) [hereinafter Recommendations of the Conference]; see also Report of the
Working Group, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1824-25 (1999). For a further discussion
of ghostwriting issues, see John C. Rottermich, Note, Ethical and Procedural Implica-
tions of 'Ghostwriting' for Pro Se Litigants: Toward Increased Access to Justice, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2687, 2690-92 (1999). Regarding the arguments on both sides of
the unbundled legal services debate, compare Mary Helen McNeal, Responses to the
Conference: Having One Oar or Being Without a Boat, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617,
2617-19, 2641-48 (tentatively accepting the viability of unbundled legal services as a
mode of assistance for low-income litigants, but recognizing weaknesses in this ap-
proach and uncertainty in its effectiveness and advocating further study of the confer-
ence proposals) (1999), and Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client Roles:
Unbundling and Moderate-Income Elderly Clients, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295,
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revisited and reshaped to conform to a revised understanding of
the role of the judiciary in solving the problems of the unmet civil
legal needs of the poor.
While the judiciary must lead, the solutions necessarily involve
the entire legal community. 5 4 Around the country, an array of
limited assistance programs have sprung up as a partial response to
the surge of unrepresented litigants. 55 The legal profession must
continue to develop, with flexibility and innovation, 56 programs
short of full representation that can assist litigants in certain con-
texts.' 57 Technology and web-based resources play an important
role, but their effectiveness is limited unless supported by appro-
priate personnel.15 8 A facilitator model might be important where
litigants face a multiplicity of problems 59 and collaboration with
social services agencies is essential. 60 Ethical rules must be revised
or reinterpreted where they prohibit nonlawyers from participating
318-39 (1997) (discussing professional and ethical concerns raised by the provision of
unbundled legal services and concluding that further study is necessary before it be-
comes a truly viable option), with Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundled Legal Services and
Unrepresented Litigants: Current Developments and Future Trends, 40 FAM. CT. REV.
15, 15-18 (2002) (advocating unbundling as a way to allow people to "buy[ ] the lim-
ited help of a lawyer rather than ... navigate the legal system on their own"), and
Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. L.Q.
421, 421-26, 447-49 (1994) (advocating unbundling and explaining that "with success-
ful pro se unbundling experience, clients are gaining confidence in taking responsibil-
ity to determine the scope of legal work to meet identified legal needs"). For
information regarding unbundling initiatives in the various states, see A Look at
What is Happening Around the Country, at http://www.unbundled law.org/States/
states.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). For further information on unbundling, see
Bibliography, at http://www.unbundledlaw.org/related/biblio.htm (last visited Apr. 29,
2004).
154. See, e.g., Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 153, at 1751-74 (ad-
vocating broad reform allowing for effective integration of lawyers and non-lawyers
to assist otherwise unrepresented low-income litigants).
155. E.g., Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 103, at 2003-06 (summarizing vari-
ous legal assistance initiatives); Rasnow, supra note 83, at 1281-92 (discussing initia-
tives to provide access to justice for rural residents of Ventura County, California).
156. See ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 927.
157. E.g., Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 103, at 2003-06 (summarizing the
types of limited assistance programs that have been developed around the country);
see also Fisher-Brandveen & Klempner, supra note 84, at 1107-11 (acknowledging the
growing number of low-income civil litigants and exploring the option of 'unbundled'
legal services as a means to meet their needs); Rasnow, supra note 83, at, at 1281-92
(discussing limited assistance initiatives in a rural setting).
158. See ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 927.
159. Id.
160. Id.
1006 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
161in the programs, prohibit lawyers from helping on a limited basis
or prohibit court personnel from performing their revised roles. 162
Perhaps most importantly, we must "step back periodically to
evaluate '163 the various innovations and limited assistance pro-
grams. Programs that succeed in halting the forfeiture of rights
should be continued. 164 Programs that make the docket run more
smoothly, but do not protect the rights of the unrepresented liti-
gants, must be examined to insure that the programs are the wisest
allocation of scarce resources. Programs that serve simply to make
the work of the judges, clerks, and lawyers easier, but do not help
the unrepresented litigants, are not solutions to the problem.
165
Inevitably, the evaluation will show that, despite the revised
roles of the players and the presence of limited assistance pro-
grams, there remain categories of cases in which unrepresented liti-
gants continue to forfeit important rights due to the absence of
counsel."6 A stark choice faces us: we can acknowledge that the
promise of justice is illusory, or we can provide counsel in these
settings.1 67 In the words of the Honorable Robert W. Sweet:
161. Id. at 937 (advocating the adoption of ABA Model Rules of Prof l Conduct R.
6.5 (2001) in order to facilitate lawyer participation in pro bono initiatives).
162. Id.; see also Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 153, at 1751-74
(advocating for ethical and practical reforms in order to allow more lawyers and
nonlawyers to assist otherwise unrepresented low-income litigants).
163. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 927.
164. See, e.g., Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 103, at 2003-06 (summarizing
various legal assistance initiatives).
165. For an exploration of the issues involved in evaluating pro se initiatives, see
Richard Zorza, Evaluation of Pro Se Innovation (Sept. 24, 2002), at http://
www.zorza.net/evalofpr ose/Mass-Pro-Se-Eval-9-02_files/v3_document.htm (provid-
ing an interactive slide show raising issues and concerns relevant to the evaluation of
pro se initiatives).
166. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 103, at 1989, 2020-21 (discussing the
pressures placed on unrepresented litigants to forfeit rights and accept settlements
which are not in their best interests by opposing counsel and judges eager to clear
their dockets of such cases); Hon. Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a
Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 503, 505 (1998).
167. See John McKay, Federally Funded Legal Services: A New Vision of Equal
Justice Under Law, 68 TENN. L. REV. 101, 105 (2000).
Courts and the legal community have expressly recognized the connection
between one's right to counsel and due process. The criminal justice system
has long provided that a person who cannot afford a lawyer should be ap-
pointed one, regardless of the costs; a defendant without representation has
little chance of receiving a fair trial .... In the absence of adequate federal,
state, and private investment in civil legal services, the courts could well en-
tertain a Civil Gideon constitutional challenge and mandate representation
by an attorney when individual health, safety, or welfare is found at issue.
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What needs doing to help the courts maintain the confidence of
the society and to perform the task of insuring that we are a just
society under a rule of law?.... [W]e need a civil Gideon, that
is, an expanded constitutional right to counsel in civil matters.
Lawyers, and lawyers for all are essential to the functioning of
an effective justice system. 6
It is neither feasible nor advisable to adopt a Civil Gideon that
mandates appointment of counsel for all litigants in all civil pro-
ceedings. 169 The adoption of a Civil Gideon will necessarily in-
volve hard choices regarding which cases, which litigants and which
settings.170 We should not categorically reject the Small Claims
model.17' To the contrary, the model of an impartial judge charged
with the obligation to develop the record and achieve justice re-
gardless of the skills of parties, might be an important one to repli-
cate in other settings.172 In some cases in which both parties are
without counsel, adjustments to the roles of the players may be
sufficient to achieve justice.173 In other instances, the revised roles
combined with innovative assistance programs may be sufficient,
although that can only be assessed through ongoing and accurate
evaluation. In still other instances, the deprivation of rights may
simply not rise to a level at which we can conclude there was a
miscarriage of justice.174
Counsel must be provided where important rights are at stake
and likely to be forfeited due to the absence of counsel.175 It is
168. Sweet, supra note 166, at 503 (citation omitted).
169. See Fisher-Brandveen & Klempner, supra note 84, at 1107-11 ("[L]egal ser-
vices budgets continue to be cut and thousands of potential clients are turned away
each year"; acknowledging the shortage of attorneys to assist the growing number of
low-income litigants and suggesting 'unbundled' legal services as part of a solution).
170. But see Sweet, supra note 166, at 506 ("To seek to limit this proposed right to
counsel [in civil cases] would simply serve to defeat the right.").
171. Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 103, at 2016-17.
172. Id. At 2016-18 ("The precedents from small claims courts and administrative
agencies serve as an important reminder that impartiality does not require judges to
be passive.").
173. See id. at 1990-91.
174. Cf Sweet, supra note 166, at 505-06 (advocating that a Civil Gideon right to
representation by counsel "should arise whenever access to the justice system is
warranted").
175. 1 read Justice Johnson's reqent article on Civil Gideon as providing support for
this approach:
In one sense, the possibility of satisfying this constitutional imperative, short
of declaring an absolute right to counsel in civil cases, could make it easier
for an appellate court to recognize such a right. After all, in doing so, the
courts would not be mandating government pay for a lawyer in each and
every civil dispute involving an indigent on one side or the other. Instead,
they would be limiting the mandate to cases and forums where disputants
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beyond the scope of this essay to set forth the full list of rights we
should consider important. A good place to start is Chief Justice
Kaye's list, which includes the crises of families facing homeless-
ness, eviction, deportation, and foster care.176 The risk of errone-
ous forfeiture is heightened where unrepresented litigants are
pitted against represented ones in cases involving such important
rights. 177 Advocates in Maryland recently tried to achieve a Civil
Gideon in a family law context.178 Advocates in Washington State
are pursuing similar litigation involving the eviction of an elderly
tenant and the isolation and deportation of a fourteen-year-old. 79
The failure of the courts to recognize a right to counsel in such
cases continues an American trend that remains in stark contrast to
decisions abroad. 180
cannot obtain a fair hearing unless assisted by a lawyer ... Thus, if they are
to guarantee truly effective access to low income civil litigants, appellate
courts would not only have to recognize a right to equal justice, but also over
time establish definitive standards.
Johnson, Will Gideon's Trumpet Sound?, supra note 116, at 218-19.
176. Kaye, Foreword, supra note 2, at 833.
177. See Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 103, at 1988-89 (discussing the risk
to unrepresented litigants of forfeiting important rights due to a combination of their
lack of familiarity with adversarial proceedings and pressure to accept ill-advised set-
tlements from opposing counsel and "judges ... driven by docket control"). "When
both sides appear without counsel, the traditional configuration of the adversarial sys-
tem has been altered; when one side is represented while the other is not, it has bro-
ken down." Id. at 2022.
178. See Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114, 115, 123 (Md. 2003). The Maryland Court
of Appeals held, by a 4-3 vote, that a lower court had wrongly imposed conditions on
Deborah Frase's custody of her son. See id. at 125-29. The majority also ruled, how-
ever, that it was inappropriate to rule on Ms. Frase's claim of a right to counsel citing,
among other reasons, that the litigation was over. Id. at 115 (stating that it was "both
unnecessary and inappropriate.., to address the right-to-appointed-counsel issue").
The three concurring judges were prepared to recognize the right to counsel in cases
involving the fundamental right of parents to parent their children. Id. at 131-42
(Bell, J., concurring). "I would reach the [ I issue.... [and] would resolve it by hold-
ing that in cases involving the fundamental right of parents to parent their children,
especially when the parent is a defendant..., counsel should be provided for those
parents who lack independent means to retain private counsel." Id. at 141 (Bell, J.,
concurring).
179. The eviction case is City of Moses Lake v. Smith, No. 01-2-007668 (Wash. Sup.
Ct. Grant Cty. July 8, 2001) (pleadings on file with author). The Immigration case is
Machado v. Ashcroft, No. CS-02-0066-FVS (E.D. Wash. Mar. 20, 2002) (pleadings on
file with author).
180. Efforts by advocates in New York City in the 1980's to establish a right to
counsel in eviction cases to prevent homelessness became mired in a procedural mo-
rass. See Donaldson v. State, 548 N.Y.S.2d 676, 676-78 (App. Div. 1989) (finding a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and transferring the case to the Supreme Court,
Bronx County for a determination in the first instance as to whether there is a "right
to assigned counsel for indigent defendants facing summary eviction proceedings in
Housing Court"). For an exploration of the efforts in New York City, see Russell
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Such an initiative will not occur without a struggle. A "thought-
ful, comprehensive and creative" response from an organized legal
community is required.s'aPeople will respond if they are asked to
help;182 however, the asking will be easier and the response will be
greater if there is consensus around the need to solve the crisis and
the best way to utilize each element of the legal community. 183
Through this route, volunteers-whether lawyers or lay advo-
cates-can most efficiently be trained and channeled into opportu-
nities that are easy to identify and rewarding to perform. 8 n
Inevitably, even heroic efforts from volunteers will not resolve
the crisis. The disaster of 9/11 exposed the limits of the capacity of
the private bar to mobilize volunteers. 185 Significant numbers of
lawyers reported that they might be "too busy" to perform future
pro bono work, and a disturbing twenty percent of the litigators
reported that pro bono work is "not valued by [their] law firm or
company. "186 The Report confirms Professor Deborah Rhode's
findings, particularly regarding the extent that workplace practices
limit pro bono participation.18 7
Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers' Negotia-
tions with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79, 104-15 (1997). The analy-
sis supporting the claims is set forth in Andrew Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to
Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557, 562-87 (1987). For a description of successful decisions
abroad in courts in Switzerland, Germany, and Canada, as well as the European
Court of Human Rights, see Johnson, Equal Access to Justice, supra note 116, at 89-
91, 104-110.
181. See ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 840.
182. Id. at 937-38 (explaining that when needs are clearly identified, people will
specifically attempt to fulfill them).
183. E.g., id. at 932 (explaining that "every element of the national legal commu-
nity[,J" including the "public interest services community" and "nonlawyers from
within the legal community" had roles to play and made significant contributions to
the 9/11 legal relief efforts).
184. See id. at 932 (noting that "[t]raining was crucial-in part because with train-
ing, all lawyers are capable of providing pro bono services" and that "[s]everal of the
9/11 legal relief projects made effective use of nonlawyers from within the legal
community").
185. See id. at 907.
186. Id. at 925. Sixty-six percent of law firm lawyers, and forty-four percent of sole
practitioners identified being "too busy" as the factor most likely to prevent them
from performing future pro bono work. Id.
187. Rhode, supra note 48, at 447-54. The deficiencies in workplace policies in-
cludes the poor structure of formal policies, workplace policies concerning resources,
rewards, and recognition, and the effect of pro bono work on promotion and bonus
decisions. Id. For example, "[o]ver a third of surveyed lawyers said that their organi-
zation's informal reward structures were at odds with formal policies supporting pro
bono work." Id. at 451.
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The public interest legal community will remain a vital contribu-
tor to the response.188 Yet, "[m]ore financial resources are needed
to achieve full access to civil legal assistance."189 Absent additional
funds, the public interest community will be unable to do more
than scratch the surface of the problem.19 ° As with the 9/11 crisis,
funding will be essential. 191 The more coordinated the efforts of
the legal community are, the greater the likelihood that we can
reach consensus on how to shift existing financial and human re-
sources and identify and leverage new ones. Only then will the
legal community be at the forefront of efforts to move the country
beyond the sad feature of our legal system, captured by the words
of Justice Johnson, a keynote speaker at the New York Access to
Justice Conference:
It is the tragedy of the present we remain insular and smug
about our nation's superiority in all things related to 'justice,'
while millions of poor U.S. citizens are denied this precious
right. It is the hope of the future the United States will finally
open its eyes and embrace the 'practical and effective' right to
equal justice most Western democracies now guarantee. When
that day comes-and it may come soon-millions of U.S. citi-
zens will, for the first time, truly have their day in court.' 92
CONCLUSION
As we rightfully celebrate the successes documented in the Re-
port, we should also envision the legal community's future public
service efforts. The legal community must meet the unmet, post-9/
11 needs, insure that other "crises" in the legal system are ad-
dressed, and apply to other crises the lessons learned from the re-
sponse to the September 11th crisis. By achieving these ambitious
goals, we will truly honor the victims of September 11th and their
families and friends.
188. ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 932-33 (explaining that the public
interest community can be especially helpful due to their "unparalleled experience
ministering to the needs of the poor and working with those in distress").
189. Houseman, supra note 81, at 1233.
190. See id.
191. See ABCNY FUND, ET AL., supra note 1, at 927.
192. Johnson, Equal Access to Justice, supra note 116, at 110.
1010
